

Relationship 2.0

*Noam Ebner & Adam Kamp**

***Editors' Note:** Ebner and Kamp examine the treatment of relationships in typical negotiation teaching, and conclude that critics of our field and its doctrines have a point: in several ways, our doctrines set students up for failure when dealing with "hard" bargainers, because of a tension that is not only unresolved but unadmitted. The authors argue that the first thing needed is for teachers to be transparent about "relationship doctrine" – because actually doing something different is going to be a daunting task. They go on to explain why.*

Introduction

The way the concept of relationship is taught in contemporary negotiation education leaves students with an unclear, and often conflicted, picture of its nature and role. We believe that negotiation teachers prime students to consider a positive relationship between negotiators as a value in itself, for reasons that might be based either on our grasp of ethics and fairness, or on the relational framework we would prefer to see transactions and interactions based on.

We suggest that the place of this advocacy in negotiation education should be closely examined. We do so here by critically looking at three primary pedagogical "tools:" 1) *Getting to Yes*, which serves as a textbook or as a set of precepts underlying much of negotiation education; 2) the Dual Concerns or Bargaining Styles graph; and 3) the Prisoner's Dilemma game. All three tools – or the way they are used in the classroom – advocate for a *particular* mode of relationship

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and interaction, without teaching students how to differentiate between situations and apply approaches aimed at getting them the best deal possible for themselves in each situation. Negotiation teachers who use these tools without acknowledging their limitations are unintentionally setting up students to lose by paying a substantive price in return for maintaining a “positive” relationship.

The Negotiation 1.0 Relationship

In attempting to capture the essence of the concept of relationship in Negotiation 1.0, one would do well to start off with Roger Fisher, William Ury, and Bruce Patton’s (1991) *Getting to Yes*.¹

Getting to Yes purports to address a core problem: negotiators often find themselves cornered into a trade-off. Making concessions in the deal itself in return for the other maintaining a positive relationship is a constant possibility. By exerting pressure on two fronts at once, demanding a better deal while threatening to withhold or damage a good relationship, negotiators try to maneuver their opposites into a concession on the former in return for an easing of the pressure in the latter. However, making these concessions or being “nice,” as the authors state correctly, is no answer. On the contrary – it may make a negotiator vulnerable, perceived as weak, and open to manipulation (Fisher, Ury, and Patton 1991: 8-9).

In essence, this is a relationship problem, and in that perspective one might say *Getting to Yes* is a relationship-oriented book. In order to avoid the relationship/substance trade-off, the *Getting to Yes* model suggests that negotiators *separate the people from the problem*. By dealing with their opposite in a respectful and open manner, while not going any easier on the substance of the deal, negotiators can avoid paying a price for relationship.

Separating the people from the problem is, in essence, the core framing of relationship in negotiation in the *Getting to Yes* model. Relationship exists *alongside* the substance of the negotiation. It should be a *working* relationship, one whose costs might be measured in terms of time, patience and communication, but not in concessions on the substance of the deal. Taken in context of the complete model the book presents, the essence of a “good” negotiation relationship would then be one that supports open communication, sharing of interests, exploration of options, and presentation of and comparison of standards.

Whether educators expressly teach the *Getting to Yes* model or simply borrow some of the relational elements, it would be a fair guess to say that two core notions – maintaining a good working relationship and separation between relationship and substance – are commonly encountered principles in Negotiation 1.0 education.

The Problem

We suggest that in attempting to create a clear scheme for students to follow (“Form a good working relationship with the other without paying a price for it”) we are actually sweeping a very challenging tension under the carpet. This separation between relationship and substance is a very tricky precept to master, practically speaking. As the *Getting to Yes* authors themselves state, negotiators are humans, and human nature and the dynamics of negotiation challenge our ability to separate relationship and substance. Manipulative negotiators you face – be it your boss or your three year old daughter – will *always* attempt to tie the two elements of relationship and substance together. More challenging, manipulative negotiators will often be supported in their behavior by internal and external forces affecting you. By assuming that the tension is always easily overcome by one approach, regardless of context, regardless of culture, regardless of personality, we are not preparing students to analyze, recognize, contextualize, and choose how to manage this tension situationally.

Furthermore, we suggest that there is more being said about relationship, through other elements of a negotiation course or an executive training, that affects the way a student grasps this tension and the ways to resolve it. As we will detail below, the sum total of input we present our students with regarding the concept of relationship in negotiation presents them with a confusing, unbalanced – perhaps even lopsided – grasp of the concept and its operationalization.

What are we teaching students about relationship in negotiation? We will try to uncover this by examining three commonly employed teaching tools which deal with relationship either directly or obliquely. Negotiation teaching has always relied upon mixing multiple methods for enhancement of learning; a danger, rarely explored, is that our covert or unintended messages are reinforced by this multiplicity of methods. To show how the messages regarding relationships permeate negotiation pedagogy, we will focus on three different types of teaching tools – a book, a model, and an interactive exercise:

- 1) *Getting to Yes* (the book itself, and/or training materials structured around it)
- 2) The Dual Concerns / Bargaining Style model
- 3) The Prisoner’s Dilemma game

Getting to Yes

In this chapter, we will consider the book as a teaching tool, due both to its prevalence as required reading in negotiation courses, and to its influence as the basis for training structure and material.²

As discussed above, *Getting to Yes* attempts to lay out a clear picture of the negotiation relationship, as a vehicle for carrying the negotiation along productively without interfering with the substance of the deal.

However, it would seem that no sooner have we been offered a way out by striving towards a separation between people and problem, than we are once again sucked back into people-issues. Instead of leaving this notion of separation as a stand-alone, overarching precept, the authors attempt to simplify things by becoming prescriptive, breaking down just how this separation might be accomplished. We suggest that in this breakdown of do's and don'ts, the authors lead negotiators along a relationship-tightrope walk, along which human nature beckons them to fall into relationship-traps (or to use Fisher, Ury, and Patton's own terminology, situations in which negotiators will be tempted to pay a substantive price for maintaining the relationship) at every turn.

The *Getting to Yes* authors recommend four things regarding relationship:

- 1) You need to listen well, allowing the other to express themselves as best as they can (Fisher, Ury, and Patton 1991: 34);
- 2) You need to give the other space and allow them to vent, without reacting to emotional outbursts (Fisher, Ury, and Patton 1991: 31-32);
- 3) You need to step into the other's shoes, enabling yourself to see things from their perspective, and then reconsider your position (Fisher, Ury, and Patton 1991: 23-24); and
- 4) You need to view the other as a partner, not a competitor or enemy (Fisher, Ury, and Patton 1991: 37).

Each of these recommendations (intended to be "universally applicable") is hazardous to some extent in itself; in the aggregate, they are almost certain to cause the negotiator to fall into the very relationship traps he or she is attempting to avoid. We will briefly discuss some of the reasons we consider each of these recommendations to be hazardous, and then focus on the list as a whole.

Listen

Can it really be that the prescription to listen is *always* suitable, context notwithstanding? For example, this approach assumes an honest, straightforward speaker, and one who lacks the self-awareness to doctor one's statements for the benefit of one's counterpart. This is hardly the case. Such uncritical listening to a manipulative negotiator frames the entire discussion in a context that may have little bearing to the counterpart's actual reality, and can build sympathy

for a situation that is in fact mostly or entirely illusory. While it may of course be possible to counter this, later on, through reframing, it is setting the negotiator up for the challenge of applying that complex skill successfully. In any event, few teachers of negotiation discuss any potential value in *not* listening to the other party, or consider other models of discussion.

Allow venting, avoid reacting

Not only is the expectation that we try to forego emotionality in the face of a heated outburst a sheer impossibility, but here in particular the suggestion that negotiators should allow the other party emotions they deny themselves has the result of valuing the other's feelings over their own. If venting serves a purpose in negotiation, then it might be something we should consider allowing ourselves to do as well – passing the onus to be accepting, understanding, forgiving (and perhaps even conceding) over to the other party. While there may be an advantage to recognizing a counterpart's emotions and stake in the game, this should not come at the cost of one's own emotional interests – yet that might be just the result of such a one-sided process-concession.

Recognize partisan perceptions

In a sense, this is a third variant of the same theme: where in the first suggestion the negotiator may adopt the other's factual scenario, and in the second the other's emotional state, here the unwitting negotiator is asked to inhabit the other's perceptions. This is by no means an uncommon message; any negotiation class spends a great deal of time teaching students to recognize that our perceptions are flawed, from counting the number of times a letter appears in a simple sentence and reaching different conclusions each time,³ to counting basketball passes in a video – completely overlooking something normally thought of as much more arresting (a gorilla passing by).⁴ Multiple generations of women are drawn, from a single image, and mobilized to demonstrate the notion that people can view the same issue differently in the physical world, much more so in the world of ideas and opinions.⁵ But – despite the *Getting to Yes* authors' protestations that one can understand another's perception without adopting it – is that necessarily true? Remember, we are being advised to understand the other's perception in a reality in which the other might not be concerned about understanding our own. This creates an imbalance: two parties understand Party A's perceptions, but only one party understands Party B's perceptions. Might this not have the effect of shifting the balance towards Party A's perceptions – which both parties can appreciate? For example,

consider that better outcomes are generally a product of setting high values for oneself (see Schneider 2006; Freshman and Guthrie 2009). When the *Getting to Yes* authors suggest that understanding another's perceptions may cause one to re-evaluate the merits of one's own claim, doing so is counter to keeping one's own goals high, and may result in unnecessarily lowering one's expectations.

Of course, whether one has a competitive or a cooperative bargaining style, one might still find it useful to understand the other's perceptions in order to better cast one's own response in terms one's counterpart may understand (Brown 2009). But without clarifying the dangers of understanding those partisan perceptions so profoundly that they become the dominant frame of the conflict, this advice might lead the unwary reader awry.

Partner-ize the other

This is potentially the most dangerous trap, because it assumes mutuality of purpose. If the other side is treating you as a partner, then in most cases the most productive solution is going to be to treat the other as a partner as well. The book treats the creation of trust necessary to create such a partnership as simple, taken in stride. However, especially when considering an experienced and manipulative negotiator, those same overtures can be used to create a false sense of partnership; the trappings of trust-building, such as gifts or friendly statements, can lead us to make concessions based on preserving the relationship that we have assumed to exist.

Aggregate hazards

Taken all together, these recommendations lead students down an even more hazardous path regarding relationship, owing to the potential implication of one party adopting this general mode of behavior regardless of their opposite's actions. If these recommendations (and others offered in chapter two of *Getting to Yes*) were made by a mediator speaking to both parties at once, or if one could promise that all negotiators would read *Getting to Yes* and adopt it to the same degree, these would be wonderful recommendations. As the authors say in their introduction to the method:

Dealing with a substantive problem and maintaining a good working relationship need not be conflicting goals if the parties are committed and psychologically prepared to treat each separately on its own legitimate merits (Fisher, Ury, and Patton 1991: 21).

However, these recommendations are made to *individual negotiators*, who (in the rest of the chapter following the above quote) are charged with taking responsibility to conduct an effective negotiation for *both* parties, to ensure effective and productive communication between *both* parties, and for understanding the other party and where they are coming from. As a cluster of recommendations, this package seems highly likely to send the average negotiator (and, in particular, the average negotiation trainee or student – our target audience as negotiation educators) right back down the path of being *more concerned about the relationship than the other* – and falling into the same old trap of paying a price for it.

The risk associated with these recommendations might well be worthwhile if following them could be guaranteed to deliver the desired combination of a working relationship with no associated substantive costs, and the best deal possible for the individual negotiator following them. Obviously, that cannot be guaranteed in any individual case. Moreover, even the suggestion that these recommendations are *applicable* in all cases (and beneficial in most) seems to be predicated on certain relational assumptions, which might be called into question:

Assumption #1: relationship always matters. “Any method of negotiation may be fairly judged by 3 criteria: It should produce a wise agreement, if agreement is possible. It should be efficient. And it should improve or at least not damage the relationship between the parties” (Fisher, Ury, and Patton 1991: 4). This top-level depiction of the desired correlation between a negotiation method and the concept of relationship is well laid out – but where does it come from? It seems to be an outcome of the authors’ more general assumption about relationship *always* being an interest of individual negotiators:

Every negotiator wants to reach an agreement that satisfies his substantive interests. That is why one negotiates. Beyond that, a negotiator also has an interest in his relationship with the other side. An antiques dealer wants both to make a profit on the sale, and to turn the customer into a regular one. At a minimum, a negotiator wants to maintain a working relationship good enough to produce an acceptable agreement if one is possible given each side’s interests. Most negotiations take place in the context of an ongoing relationship where it is important to carry on each negotiation in a way that will help, rather than hinder future relations and future negotiations ...” (Fisher, Ury, and Patton 1991: 19-20).

This is certainly often true. However – it is often *not* true. Sometimes the relationship does *not* matter. And sometimes, relationship matters in quite the opposite way of what the authors intended (i.e., “maintaining a good relationship matters”). Sometimes, the only relationship I may want with someone is to squeeze all I can out of them. Perhaps I, as an individual negotiator, want a relationship dynamic that will produce an acceptable agreement *without* taking the other’s interests into account. Perhaps (in the context of an ongoing relationship) I want to set up an uneven dynamic in this negotiation, so that we will continue to play it out, reflexively, in future negotiations.

Teaching students that the future always matters and that relationships always matter is purposely telling them only half the story; more important, we need to teach students how to assess the value of a relationship or gauge the shadow the future should cast.

The premise that relationship always matters leads to the second assumption, also evidenced in the excerpt quoted above:

Assumption #2: a positive relationship is always a good thing. This is also only a partial portrayal of reality, which might be misleading to students. Sometimes a vague relationship, unsettling to the other party, might play out in our favor. Sometimes maintaining a highly-visible bad relationship with another will pay off for us by serving as a warning to external partners of the cost of not giving in to us.

In addition, and perhaps most importantly in the context of this chapter, this assumption undercuts the basic principle of “separate the people from the problem” even as it aims to support it. It is hard to imagine how with this precept in mind, we will be able to avoid falling into relationship traps in order to maintain something that is “always positive.”

Assumption #3: a shield, not a sword. Relationship being used manipulatively is something you need to be on guard against, and defend yourself from. It is *not* something you should use yourself, to gain advantage from another.

Fisher, Ury, and Patton themselves state that, “If your response to sustained, hard bargaining is soft positional bargaining, you will probably lose your shirt” (Fisher, Ury, and Patton 1991: 8-9). Taking this prescriptively, it would seem as if someone with a knack for hard bargaining would do well to consider employing this very approach, when he or she finds themselves (lacking a shirt and) dealing with a negotiation opposite adopting a soft approach. However, no such recommendation (“If you are skilled at hard bargaining – and we will be learning how to bargain well – use it to take the

other's shirt") is made, or is likely to be made by those teaching Negotiation 1.0 (see Ebner and Efron 2009).

Assumption #4: adopting this approach to relationship cannot hurt you. Striving for a working relationship, based on separating the people from the problem, will not have a negative effect. If you etch "separate the people from the problem" on the inside of your skull, you can engage in unavoidably relational activities without risking falling back into relationship traps.

In this context, we might share a war-story: Bargaining in Istanbul's Grand Bazaar during the 2009 Istanbul Conference, one of our colleagues inquired as to the price of a small carpet. The merchant replied that it costs \$100, but that for her he would make it \$80. She told the merchant she might return, and left. Over lunch, she related that she really wanted the carpet, but that the price was prohibitive. She did not want to spend more than \$30-35 on a carpet. When advised to return to the stall and offer the merchant \$20 for the carpet, she turned a horrified face and said "I couldn't do that! It would be so insulting!" Her colleagues asked her three questions:

- 1) How do you know that would be insulting? (You are in a foreign culture, assuming relational norms about a person you have known for ten minutes.)
- 2) Why do you care if it is insulting? (Assuming that if the price range remains anchored to the merchant's opener, you are not going to buy the carpet anyway – and will never see this merchant again – so why does the relationship matter to you?)
- 3) Do you think the carpet merchant was afraid of insulting *you* by highballing you with the initial \$100 price and with the transparent manipulation of giving you a "discount?" (What is the cost of only one party caring about the relationship?)

Had our colleague really been able to separate the people from the problem, offering \$20 would not have posed a problem at all. However, her overarching desire to avoid forming a negative relationship with the merchant by insulting him negated her ability to separate the people from the problem. This occurred despite the fact that this was a textbook one-shot interaction, with astronomical odds against the two of them ever meeting up again interdependently. This elementary people-trap was overwhelming, despite the fact that having taught negotiation for thirty years, she had probably said the sentence "separate the people from the problem" a thousand times. Falling into a simple people-trap, she found herself deliberating between two disadvantageous options: avoidance – not returning to the stall and losing out on a beautiful carpet for her home – or making an offer that she felt would not insult the mer-

chant – \$40 (which was, itself, beyond the reservation point she had set for spending in the bazaar, and which certainly would have been countered by the merchant with a higher figure of his own, such as \$65). If a deal had been reached in this fashion, it would probably have been for about \$50-55 – leading our colleague to pay much more than her carpet budget for the dubious “value” of a maintained good relationship with the merchant.⁶

Having understood these dynamics, and being of adventurous spirit, she agreed to return to the stall and offer \$20 for the carpet. As expected, rather than declaring a blood feud between them as a result of a horrible insult, the merchant countered with a concession of his own; the deal was sealed for \$35.

The final two assumptions, while not directly focused on relationship, have to do with two issues which are, as we shall see, tightly interwoven with this issue in the framework laid out by *Getting to Yes*: interest-based bargaining and cooperation.

Assumption #5: it is always possible to avoid the trade-off. A fundamental premise underlying the approach laid out in *Getting to Yes* is that negotiators can, and should *always*, engage in interest-based bargaining in order to avoid paying for relationship with concessions: “If you do not like the choice between hard and soft positional bargaining, you can change the game” (Fisher, Ury, and Patton 1991: 9).

This is not always possible, or practical, for a number of reasons.

- *The stakes are too low.* In a situation with limited time and limited value, the time spent exploring interests is in itself a concession, and the item bargained for is simply not worthwhile. In a later work, one of the authors admits this might be the case (Fisher 1984).
- *Interests are directly oppositional.* In the Turkish bazaar, what other interests were directly implied by the negotiation? The merchant would certainly prefer to be treated with respect and fairness, but when it came to the price of the rug, those interests were clearly secondary to getting the highest possible price for the rug. This is especially true in the case of a tourist; the expected return in making a concession on price in order to aim for the slim chance of accumulating repeat business is meager. In such a case, the interests available to the negotiator are mostly those that can be reached via positional bargaining.⁷
- *The other party flatly refuses.* Fisher, Ury, and Patton are alert to this possibility, and suggest a number of ways that positional bargaining can be deflected. But in the case of negotiators who determine that they are more likely to get a better out-

come via positional than interest-based negotiation (possibly due to one of the above factors), then if one values the object of the negotiation sufficiently (or has too low a best alternative to negotiated agreement (BATNA), one will have to accept (and excel at) positional bargaining in order to meet one's personal objectives.

Assumption #6: competition is bad. A general reading of *Getting to Yes* leaves one with the sense that applying power – the underlying dynamic of most competitive moves – is somewhat dirty; it is the type of thing the positional bargainers do and which the interest-focused negotiators must sidestep and reframe. The only “acceptable” purpose of applying power is not to get a better outcome for oneself, but to enable a fair outcome for both parties; therefore, hard bargaining is only acceptable to the point that it enables a resolution on the “merits.”

Put simply, a competitive approach to negotiation endangers relationships; this statement is left as an obvious evil that needs no further justification (Fisher, Ury, and Patton 1991: 6).⁸ In fact, many situations might make taking a competitive approach a reasonable action, either trading the damage to the relationship for other gains or not actually causing harm to a relationship at all:⁹

- *When the stakes are too high.* It is sadly not too difficult to imagine situations where one's interests in the outcome are so high that the relationship is only valuable insofar as it gets you the best result for this negotiation alone: a hostage situation with a kidnapper operating alone, for example. A lesser example might be an item that is rare or unique and deeply valuable for objective or personal reasons.
- *When there is no relationship to speak of.* The tourist negotiator might be an example of a one-shot deal in which allowing a false sense of relationship to affect our actions might be self-defeating.¹⁰ We might also note cases of “negative relationship” – in which one's negotiation opposite, by either poor reputation or actual broken promises, has elicited one's distrust.¹¹
- *When the other party is not highly motivated.* If our counterpart has low motivation regarding the value we are trying to obtain or extract from them, early competitive action might cause them to withdraw from the playing field and abandon the prize to us.
- *When relationships in one's counterpart's culture are not harmed by competitive bargaining.* The critique of *Getting to Yes'* universal application in light of recognition of the different negotiating values of different cultures is an ongoing discussion (see

Bernard 2009, LeBaron and Patera 2009; Bernard, *Re-Orienting the Trainer to Navigate*, in this volume), and not the primary intent of this article. Still, we must note that one of the primary drawbacks ascribed to competitive negotiation in the book's framework is that it is harmful to relationships. At the very least this assumption must be interrogated with respect to culture: most likely, it simply does not apply in many parts of the globe, and trying to use a paradigm of integrative negotiation may even smack of cultural imperialism. One may still apply some of the lessons of principled negotiation as a matter of self-protection, but to add an additional concern of respecting the relationship itself may be costly and unnecessary.

For all these reasons, then, the foundational text for many negotiation classes is very much incomplete in the picture it paints of relationship. It admonishes readers not to pay a price for a good relationship – yet, at the same time, it extols the value of a good relationship to such an extent that it seems it is worth paying almost *any* price in order to obtain one! In a real-life situation, this might easily translate into even the most wary “separate the people from the problem” novice making seemingly small concessions in the deal in order to obtain a good relationship. This is not an insuperable obstacle; any number of teaching tools are capable of dealing with this weakness. Too often, though, those tools are used, not to soften this overemphasis on relationship, but to reinforce it.

Dual Concerns Model/Bargaining Styles Model

While negotiation teaching has offered several frameworks for conceptualizing the negotiation process, no particular model describing and analyzing the entire process seems to have been generally accepted by the field.¹² As a result, in seeking out a model to explore for overt and implied messages regarding relationship, we decided to discuss a model that seeks not to describe negotiation in its entirety, but rather one important aspect of the process: strategies that negotiators adopt to guide them through their interactions with the other.

The model we will discuss enjoys different names and different purposes, but in one form or another it shows up in every negotiation course the authors are familiar with.¹³




Figure 1 - The Dual Concerns Model

The Dual Concerns Model was originally developed as a conflict style or conflict orientation framework, presenting a theory of individual predilection for action in conflict situations. The notion that people have a tendency to act in similar patterns when encountering conflict, context notwithstanding, is an eye-opener for many, in that it contradicts our strongly held beliefs regarding rational decision making on a case-specific basis. This theory has been supported by several studies, and as a result has become the basis for instruments (such as the popular instrument developed by Kilmann and Thomas (1977) aimed at gauging an individual's style (Pruitt and Kim 2004).

Another form this model takes is that of a framework for choice of conflict management approach, whether by a dyad (e.g., two opposing parties deciding to attempt cooperation) or by an individual (e.g., someone engaged in conflict deciding to yield).

Finally, this model is often used to capture the range of *strategies* a negotiator might adopt in a given situation. In other words, in any particular situation, with a specific opposite, within a given context, an individual negotiator must design an overall gameplan, to be implemented through specific moves in the negotiation process. In this process of conscious strategic choice, the dual concern model pre-

sents five possible approaches from which to *choose* (Pruitt and Kim 2004).¹⁴

This multiple usage of the Dual Concerns Model does little to contribute clarity to negotiation teaching, particularly in that it often blurs the distinction between orientation and strategy, or between instinct and choice. Having said that, it is perhaps the most commonly encountered framework in negotiation teaching and – so long as the teacher is very explicit regarding just what it is being used to describe – a very useful tool.

Assuming that this framework is being taught to help students understand and improve their decision-making process with regard to negotiation, what are the implied messages of this model with regard to the role of relationship?

First of all, the model can be – and sometimes is – taught without any reference being made to relationship. The focus, then, is on “concern with my gains” vs. “concern with other’s gains.” While this might seem to simplify things by taking this model out of the realm of relationship-related material students are exposed to, the opposite might be true. What are the implications of a student expressing zero concerns with another’s outcome, and giving *no* thought to the relationship? This might be a very dangerous proposition. As a result, discussion of relationship usually finds its way into study of the model, particularly as the cooperation-zone of the graph is discussed. In some teaching and training material, the chart itself includes “concern for the relationship” as part of the graph – treated either as synonymous with, or instead of, “concern for other’s gains” (see, e.g., Filley 1975).

While it is hard to pin down specific messages always discussed regarding relationship, the following are some themes that we are certain most teachers will recognize from this point in a negotiation course:

- There is a correlation between a good relationship and cooperation.
- Cooperation is facilitated by a positive relationship (resulting in the trust, and risk-taking, that cooperation often requires).
- A good relationship is, in itself, a trigger for cooperative behavior (as parties prefer working together to rocking the boat).

These themes are all valid – but they are only a partial depiction of the picture. The questions they raise would require a more complex discussion of cooperation and relationship than most classrooms currently provide. This is compounded by teachers’ gravitation towards certain areas on the chart. In a typical class-

room, no more than a few sentences will be said regarding accommodating, or avoidance – as if these are things come naturally to us and have negative connotations; so why learn about them? Actually, of course, many situations merit choosing those strategies, but we do not engage in analytical or prescriptive discussion about them. Of course, a discussion about when to choose a yielding or accommodating strategy would be a wonderful opportunity to contrast concession-making due to high concerns for the other's goals, with "separate the people from the problem." And yet, this opportunity is usually lightly passed over, or perhaps avoided.

Perhaps even more troubling is the somewhat intuitive placement of "compromise" in the center of the chart. From this placement, students are led to believe that all parties to a compromise feel something along the lines of "If we were able to come to a compromise and not go all-out against each other, we must have some ability to work together; we're not viewing each other negatively, and we can go home and live our lives without harboring ill-wishes to one another." In short, we compromise because we place at least some value on the relationship itself.

This is wrong even on a strictly goals-focused level: in the real world, we usually do not compromise because we are concerned with the other's goals, but because we are concerned about the other's power and the damage they might do to our outcome. In reality, many people choose (or are dragged kicking and screaming into) compromise even though they feel that the other is taking advantage of them, or even stealing what is rightfully theirs, and wish that the other would get hit by a bus upon leaving the conference room.

Placing "compromise" in the middle is not a depiction of concerns but of outcomes. On the level of outcome analysis, similarly, many people leave a compromise feeling not that they gained half of what they expected, and that they have a halfway good relationship with the other – but rather, that they lost half of what was theirs and that the other is to blame.

If we were to tell the outcome-oriented narrative of compromise instead of the simplistic centering on the Dual Concerns chart, a very different story of relationships would emerge, in which finding common ground is as much a function of power as of personal connection, and where an agreement that fits both parties' economic needs (and may even be maximally Pareto-efficient!) might not be accompanied by a positive relationship at all when each party thinks the other is being unfair or unjust.¹⁵ At the very least, it would ensure that the connection of "good relationships equals good outcomes" is not so clearly drawn.

Teachers tend to gravitate towards the “cooperation” area of the chart. Usually, they do so through comparison of this strategy with a competitive strategy. For reasons we will discuss later on, cooperation is usually given the spotlight, and the advantages of cooperation are usually driven home at this point with a simulation (such as *Ugli Orange*¹⁶), or with a story (such as about two industrious sisters with strong ties to a particularly challenging piece of citrus fruit¹⁷), or a game such as the arm-wrestling game described below. Different ways of cooperating are discussed, and integrative, pie-expanding thinking is stressed.

This typical discussion lacks two components. First, the discussion fails to examine the different factors to be considered when choosing between strategies. What contextual and situational elements need to be taken into account in order to make the best strategic choice possible – yielding or competing, compromising, accommodating or cooperating? Second, the discussion omits the role of relationship as one of those factors. To what extent should we allow a past or desired relationship to affect our choice of strategy? How can we factor this in with other elements, which might be leading us in different directions? How do we avoid paying a price for relationships?¹⁸ While negotiation theory provides us with a substantial body of knowledge for discussing and analyzing these issues, negotiation teaching tends to gravitate towards a “do whatever you can to achieve cooperation, whenever you can” – leaving students at a loss regarding elements to consider, contextual deliberations, and benefits of other strategies.

Relationship should never be detached from strategy, and strategy needs to remain an approach to achieving self-interest premised on choice. If we teach anything that breaks this chain, we are not teaching what we say we are teaching. At the heart of the discussion of strategic choice in negotiation, where we should be teaching students the negotiation version of Kenny Rogers’ famous gambling advice (“You’ve got to know when to hold ‘em, know when to fold ‘em; know when to walk away and know when to run”), we teach them, instead, to play the same hand, again and again. This theme is so pervasive that, even when another ubiquitous teaching tool, the Prisoner’s Dilemma game, would seem to dictate the necessity of changing one’s strategy as needed, the tool is used to teach just the opposite.

Prisoner’s Dilemma

Elsewhere, we have commented on the position simulation-games enjoy as the field’s favorite teaching-tool (Druckman and Ebner, 2008; Druckman and Ebner, *Enhancing Concept Learning*, in this vol-

ume; Ebner and Kovach, *Simulation 2.0: The Resurrection*, in this volume). One of the most (if not *the* most) commonly encountered type of simulation-game is that in which students participate in a game rigidly structured around a Prisoner's Dilemma (for more on the Prisoner's Dilemma, see Axelrod 1984; Schelling 1960).

To describe this type of activity in brief, students find themselves in a situation in which they have the ability to cooperate or to act non-cooperatively (this latter behavior is referred to as "defecting") towards one another. The game structure presents participants with predetermined payoffs, dependent on the aggregate of all the players' choices regarding cooperation/defection. The interaction is iterated, and communication between participants is limited and controlled by the teacher.

The precise way in which these simulation-games are conducted varies, according to the game used and the teachers' preferences. Two differentiating factors include game size and the use of storyline. Some games, such as Roger Fisher's *Oil Pricing*,¹⁹ are structured around multiple games going on in the classroom at the same time. Others, such as Ebner and Winkler's (2009) *Pasta Wars*, provide for a shared experience in which an entire class, broken down into four teams, participates in one large game (for a more complex, four-player Prisoner's Dilemma), gaining the effect of one shared experience for debrief. Another differentiating feature between different games is the question of whether the game is embedded in a storyline, or whether it is laid out as a simple set of rules to follow. In simulation-gaming parlance, some examples of these activities are simulation-games, others are just games. *Pasta Wars* (Ebner and Winkler 2009) is a simulation-game; the oft-encountered *Win As Much As You Can* (WAMAYC), which provides no background story, is a game.²⁰

When Prisoner's Dilemma games are used in class, whatever the specific game is, the post-game structure is usually the same. The class gathers again and debriefs. Scores are compared, and while there might be some instances of successful cooperation that have led participants to score many points together, other participants have forged the sort of resentment that lasts entire careers, either due to a mutually competitive approach or due to one party's unreciprocated cooperation. There will invariably be at least one case of deception or dishonesty, and at least one individual pointed out by several others as being the root of all evil (often premised not even by specific knowledge of disruption but merely by the presumption thereof).

The mix of primary lessons taught with the Prisoner's Dilemma game may depend on the teacher's goals or on the way the game played out. One primary lesson might be that of communication;

parties who are able to discuss their plans (and thereby avoid the lack of information on which the classic Dilemma is premised) can avoid negative outcomes. In games allowing for more inter-party communication, the issue might be trust, and how it relates to the concept of relationship; how can one develop the relationship necessary to ensure that the other parties will cooperate with you? When you breach trust, what happens to your outcomes? How do relationships, either pre-existing or as part of the exercise, affect this trust relationship?

What does not vary is the underlying message of the game, which is always voiced (and sometimes oft-repeated), by students or teachers: all players' outcomes will be better if they can find a way to cooperate.

No matter how often this message is repeated, far too little is said *about* it. True – in the context of the game, this is mathematically correct. However, in a discussion aimed at affecting the way students view interdependent interactions and the way they might act in them (and the Prisoner's Dilemma game, as used by negotiation teachers, undoubtedly has this underlying goal and/or effect) – this is simplistic. Shouldn't we be questioning this message, casting doubt upon this assumption?

It is a truism that the applicability of game theory to real-life negotiations is limited; when turning contextualized negotiations into arithmetical problems, much of the complexity of human interaction is lost in transition. Nevertheless, the very choice to teach with Dilemma exercises legitimizes them in the eyes of students, and a half-hearted apology for the necessary oversimplification in the game does nothing to defuse the implicit preference for cooperation. As an ideology, this is certainly appealing; as an accurate assessment of reality, it is lacking.

For a specific pedagogical example, consider the well-known game *Win As Much As You Can* (WAMAYC). This game might be the simplest Prisoner's Dilemma game of them all, in that it does not involve a simulation, a storyline or background scenario; participants are asked to choose between "cooperate or defect" (which might be reflected by "green and red," "rabbit and snake," "X and Y," or any number of variations trainers have come up with) and score points based on the aggregate of their decisions (for a further explanation of WAMAYC, see Gold 2009). In a typical debrief of the game, cooperation is privileged over competition: groups that manage to cooperate will get better outcomes than those who do not; rarely will someone who competes score as well as members of a group who cooperate well. The focus is on the negative effects of competition; students arguing that they did well for themselves by competition

might find themselves the target of persuasion by their teacher to accept that they might have done better, had they cooperated. The negative effects are framed as losses, joint (or aggregate) losses are spotlighted (without deep justification for this) and the beneficiary of those losses (if one exists in the game) is pointed out as a manifestation of the evils of competition (“We fought, so *he* was able to take *our* money”). If the game is not analyzed any more deeply, it remains a demonstration of the value of cooperation. The layers of complexity inherent in the game are ignored or paid lip service.

Here is an example of that complexity: In the last round (if a “last round” is identifiable within the game), the interaction transforms from an iterated to a one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma. Since within the context of the exercise there will be no future punishment for defecting, the risks of doing so are significantly less; in fact, your outcome will always be better if you defect than if you cooperate. A professor might overlook this aspect, or might mention it in passing. But a teacher might just as easily ask, “Okay, so you could have done better if you had defected here; in what circumstances in real life might that also be the case?” The WAMAYC game provides an opportunity to teach the viability of deliberate competitive action as another tool in the negotiator’s skill set. Yet few negotiation teachers use the game for this purpose, because it seems so at odds with the fundamental cornerstones of the field – cooperation and its close companion, relationship-building. Once again, we ask: By avoiding the opportunity to teach contextual considerations of strategy and relationship, are we not shortchanging students?

In some courses, the teacher takes the concept of the Prisoner’s Dilemma beyond the game, and teaches a bit about it, including some supplemental material and/or discussion on the topic. Unfortunately, in these as well, the supplement often focuses on a particular theme, and discusses it in such a way that the preference for cooperation is further reinforced. For example, a textbook might start with a brief explanation of how the Dilemma works, and then relate a story also popularly described by teachers: Axelrod’s work with the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma tournaments, where different strategies are pitted against one another. The strategy that works best in Axelrod’s simulations is *Tit For Tat*, a very simple strategy: On the first turn of the game, it cooperates; thereafter, it does what the other strategy did on the last turn. When pitted against one another, both these programs cooperate, and succeed very well. Against a defector, it defects in turn and minimizes losses. By cooperating with cooperators and losing little with defectors, the program does exceedingly well in the long run.

In our experience, this is about as “in-depth” as discussions of Prisoner’s Dilemma exercises get. What messages are implied in this discussion? The first is that cooperative behavior can arise from self-interest, which is entirely reasonable. Frequently, students have the perception that self-interested behavior and cooperation are at odds; the story of the Prisoner’s Dilemma and *Tit For Tat* should dismantle that perception. Moreover, it subtly augments the message of *Getting to Yes*: one can achieve better outcomes by cooperation, and the likelihood of better outcomes improves as more people choose cooperation over competition. But, by leaving this story without significant context, it also underscores the privileged status attributed to cooperation – and, by extension, to relational concern. The *Tit For Tat* strategy relies on the principle of reciprocity: one must be able both to meet cooperation with cooperation, and also to defect when the other party has done similarly. However, such reciprocal defection (taking the form of competitive actions, when translated into negotiation situations) is devalued by the tone and subtext accompanying the classroom presentation of the dilemma. Put more simply: by not teaching our students how to *Tit* effectively (and to feel legitimate in doing so), we are setting them up to be steamrolled by the other’s *Tat*!

We have demonstrated the way in which the Prisoner’s Dilemma game supports and reinforces the underlying messages discussed above, regarding *Getting to Yes*. In order to complete the triangle between the three teaching tools we have spotlighted in this chapter, let us take a look at the connection between the Prisoner’s Dilemma game and the Dual Concerns model. Of course, some connections are obvious: in the Prisoner’s Dilemma game, participants choose between the strategies the model describes, and the language used to debrief the game, contrasting “competition” with “cooperation” as well as “win/win” with “win/lose,” is the language the model is often presented in. Sometimes, the connection between the game and the model is not only done explicitly such as through content and language, but is intimated through pedagogy and course flow. In some training courses, due to lack of time, the Prisoner’s Dilemma game is condensed to a quick-setup win/win game such as the well known arm-wrestling exercise. Students, in dyads, face each other, take hold of each other’s hands, and are charged to score as many points for themselves as they can; points are scored when the back of their opposite’s hand touches the table. Often, this exercise is used in *addition* to the Prisoner’s Dilemma game, in order to stress the same points for emphasis (e.g., at the beginning of the next lesson).

In some of the trainings we have observed (and conducted), this same exercise has then been debriefed for a totally different purpose: teaching the Dual Concerns model. Asking students how they acted in the game, teachers elicit the five negotiation strategies that form the content of the Dual Concerns model, and insert them in their place on the chart. Whereas students who remained red-faced and deadlocked are shown to be epitomizing the strategy of competition (and exemplifying its downside – the 0/0 clash of the titans, or the “winner’s” relatively low score), students who *let* their opposite bang their hands down repeatedly are demonstrating a yielding or accommodating approach. Participants who decided not to play, or left the room, or talked about something else, are choosing avoidance. The spotlight then captures those students who found ways to exchange points and scored relatively high (such as by rapidly banging down one participant’s hand and then swinging over to the other side, to score one point for each); this is shown to be a (“successful”) example of a cooperation strategy, and the students gain status as being those who “succeeded” in implementing “win/win.” We mention this as a further example of how these three teaching tools interact and sometimes merge with one another. Students learn about strategies they can purportedly choose between, even while they are being taught, at the same time and with the same tools, to value relationship and to beware of competition.

In effect, using the Prisoner’s Dilemma game, the Dual Concerns model and *Getting to Yes* in the classroom, we fall into similar patterns. All of these teaching tools are premised on enlightened self-interest; the appeal of cooperation is to get better outcomes for ourselves. However, when we actually teach the material, we start to erase the self-interest aspect from the equation. Teachers become so focused on the relationship with the counterpart that, on occasions where true self-interest should be placed above the needs of the other, we have not properly trained our students to take this action. Saying “consider using *Tit For Tat*,” like teaching “separate the people from the problem” and like recommending “choose between these five strategic approaches” is how we, as teachers, give our students a challenging task – which we then proceed to make nearly impossible.

Worldview, Advocacy, and Negotiation Teaching

It would seem that the typical alumni of Negotiation 1.0 may have a vague, confused or conflicted view of what relationship means in the context of negotiation, and of how to operationalize the concept. Relationships are viewed as a tool used by manipulative negotiators in order to trip us up in a particular deal. At the same time, they are

viewed as the foundation upon which this particular deal and future deals are dependent. The dangers of relationship notwithstanding, students are not advised against relationship – on the contrary, they are taught to take responsibility for building, maintaining and preserving the relationship. Rarely, if ever, are students taught to contextualize relationship, to avoid (in practice) the costs of relationship, to capitalize on a relationship in a one-sided manner or to avoid relationship. Why then do we sustain this unbalanced, confusing portrayal of relationship?

First, there is an overarching problem with terminology. In the literature as well as in the classroom, the terms regarding relationship and strategy are used interchangeably, and are broken down into two broad categories: competitive, distributive, and positional on the one side; contrasted with cooperative, integrative, and interest-based on the other.

This dichotomy has served the negotiation field well, insofar as it depicts individual moments, turning points, decisions or actions within the negotiation process (see, for example, Lax and Sebenius 1986). However, when it is called upon in order to describe processes and approaches in the widest possible view, this division seems to be serving a different purpose altogether. Particularly so, when *positive value* is ascribed to one side of the dichotomy, and *negative value* to the other.

It has been suggested, both briefly in the previous volume of this series (Ebner and Efron 2009) and at length elsewhere in the wider literature on dispute resolution (epitomized by Condlin 2008) that as a field, we are engaging in advocacy, and in doing so, paying a price in limiting the knowledge and skills imparted. This advocacy certainly extends to the concept of relationship as well as to other issues raised in this critique (such as the embracing of interest-based negotiation over positional bargaining). In fact, seeing this worldview as an underpinning of Negotiation 1.0 goes a long way towards explaining some of the conceptual difficulties we have described in this piece.

We would suggest that this worldview is aimed at broad social change, through advocating cooperation. How might this change come to fruition, given the solidly competitive nature of the very arenas targeted for change – such as business, divorce, or international relations? Once again, we turn to game theory (keeping in mind our own caveat about real-world applicability).

In Robert Axelrod's (1984) discussion of how cooperation gains a foothold and takes root in a non-cooperative environment, he describes how this will only happen if the cooperative players do better, in the aggregate of all their interactions, than the non-cooperative

players. Once the cooperative strategy is recognized as more beneficial, non-cooperative players will need to consider adopting this strategy. But, given that [Axelrod says] in individual interactions between cooperative and non-cooperative players the non-cooperative will usually score better, how can this situation ever occur? The answer lies, Axelrod explains, in having cooperative players “invade” a non-cooperative environment as a *group*. Now, each player has interactions with both non-cooperative and cooperative players. If the payoff for mutual cooperation is sufficiently high, it will only take a relatively small amount of interactions between cooperative players to compensate for their detrimental interactions with non-cooperative players. If a few other cooperative players join in the “game,” cooperative players are now scoring so high from their mutual interactions that they are starting to gain more in the aggregate than the non-cooperative players – even though these last score higher than them when the two types interact in individual encounters. At this stage, non-cooperative players must begin to reconsider their chosen strategy and perhaps give cooperation a try.

In these terms, it would seem as if Negotiation 1.0 incorporated an effort – perhaps mainly unorchestrated – to achieve that critical mass of cooperative players needed to change the game played in key arenas and in human interactions in general.

What is the role played by relationship in this worldview? In an approach promoting cooperation over competition, and interests over positions, relationship is a central support; if not a keystone, then at least a load-bearing wall. Relationship affects the ebb and flow of interparty trust. This in turn directly affects interparty communication, impacting the information flow so crucial for interest-based negotiation. One’s approach to relationship dictates whether one focuses on a particular interaction, or zooms out to take the future into account. Relationship is the lubricant allowing cooperation when positions and needs seem to be opposed.

As a result of all this, relationship is an element that needs to be portrayed so that it supports the cooperative worldview being advocated. However, doing so is not easy, as we remain aware of the perils of a non-contextual approach to relationship. Instead, as we have seen, little more than lip service is paid to that danger, and Negotiation 1.0 continues to promote such a non-contextual approach due to the effect this has on the way students accept and begin to practice a new, cooperatively-oriented, mode/method of negotiation.

Indeed, Negotiation 1.0 took a chapter out of Axelrod’s book – a chapter he titles “How to promote cooperation” and opens with the words “This chapter takes the perspective of a reformer” (Axelrod 1984: 124). Axelrod suggests taking five strategic steps:

- 1) enlarge the shadow of the future;
- 2) change the payoff structure;
- 3) teach people to care about each other;
- 4) teach reciprocity; and
- 5) improve recognition abilities (so that players recognize other players and connect them with their acts in the past).

Obviously, issues of relationship permeate all of these steps, and they have all found their place within the teachings of Negotiation 1.0, with one exception: Negotiation 1.0 utterly fails to teach reciprocity for both cooperative *and* competitive behavior. And reciprocity – as Axelrod stresses – is *vital* for keeping cooperation running.

The result? Our field is casting our students into the world of negotiation relationship, having taken away (by omission) two key skills: contextualizing and reciprocity. Here, we have used the terms “confused,” “vague” and “conflicted” to try and capture the effect this has on students. However, going back to Negotiation 1.0’s roots, perhaps it can best be portrayed by quoting the opening sentences of *Getting Together*, another sequel to *Getting to Yes*:

What we want and what we need in a relationship are unclear

Our assumptions about relationships are often inconsistent with the kind of relationship we need to get what we want. These inconsistencies lead to confusion about our objective (Fisher & Brown 1988: 3).

A generation later, we would suggest, this description is apt. And we are part of the problem, not part of the solution.

We suggest that by not questioning – and perhaps by creating – this state of inconsistency and confusion, we have ignored the “do no harm” rule. What harm might be inherent in advocacy for a cooperative, integrative, positive-relationship oriented approach? We suggest there are two types of potential harm we need to be aware of: harm to individual practitioners, and harm to the fields of negotiation and dispute resolution.

Focusing on individual practitioners, the question of whether we are helping them to achieve the goals they set for themselves when they undertook to be our students would seem to be a fair – and even important – question for us to ask ourselves as teachers. Are we engaging in advocacy? And if so, will the system we are advocating pay off for students at least as well as any other system that we are aware of? Encouraging our students to focus on relationship and cooperation might indeed be a worthy attempt at enabling individuals and groups to evolve beyond the Tragedy of the Commons (Har-

din 1968) that characterizes so many human interactions at the micro and macro levels. Still, Axelrod's model promises low returns and poor results for the first small groups of cooperative players invading competitive environments. Is this what we are setting our students up for? It certainly is not what we are promising them!

In certain situations, these gaps between what students expect, what they are taught, and their real-world interactions are extreme and troubling (Ebner and Efron 2009). More generally, to believe that we can actually denude most negotiations of their distributive aspects, as the Negotiation 1.0 paradigm might have us do, ignores the range of situations where an adversarial attitude may be unavoidable, culturally normal or even simply desirable: for example, where there is a justified sense of victimhood or a true conflict over scarce resources (Mayer 2004). Borrowing from the parlance of our field – sometimes *both* scientists want only the juice of the *Ugli Orange*.

We certainly do not mean to imply that we should be treating competition as more valuable, or even as valuable, as cooperation. We are not suggesting substituting the present dominant worldview with any other. We are reminding all of us to focus on our students. Many, perhaps most, students take classes on negotiation in order to determine how best to get positive outcomes for themselves. The same can be said for business people engaging in corporate training. Is it the instructor's job to teach the method that he or she finds more socially, culturally, ideologically or personally appealing, or to teach all methods known for their ability to help one achieve positive outcomes for oneself, and to let the individual student determine the moral weight of cooperation versus competition?

Concededly, it may be impossible for the instructor to occupy an ideology-free space or to try to teach a subject without bias and preference. But in that instance, out of respect for the expectations of the students if for no other reason, that ideology needs to be made explicit. If a teacher finds it difficult to discuss the value of competition in certain circumstances, this issue needs at least to be named and described, and the educator's stake in rejecting it should be made transparent.

Looking at the potential harmful effects on the fields of negotiation and dispute resolution in a more general sense, we might say that the revolution advocated for by Negotiation 1.0 has worked too well – in the sense that it has permeated our own field overwhelmingly, to the point that it is holding us back. This would seem to be happening on two levels: first, we are only engaging in conflict in certain ways, and through certain lenses. Like Paul Simon's one-trick pony, we have based our entire practice, including our revenue,

on the limited set of moves that derive from our narrowed approach. Second, we are often viewed and described by outsiders through a lens which is not that far removed from our worldview – as well intentioned do-gooders.

This situation is probably connected to the fact that many teachers of Negotiation 1.0 have roots and connections in the wider fields of conflict resolution and ADR – fields that are struggling with these same issues of identity, ideology and worldview. These issues are at the core of the crisis these fields have been going through over the course of the past decade. In his book *Beyond Neutrality*, Bernard Mayer (2004) discusses the reasons that the field of conflict resolution has not yet lived up to the potential that so many people saw in it. It has not achieved wide recognition or a strong consumer base except in limited geographic or subject matter areas, has not greatly affected public policy or substantially altered society – despite having the potential to do all of those. Mayer lists “Ten beliefs that get in our way.”²¹ Among those, he lists the following beliefs, so common to those working, writing and studying in our field:

Belief #2: Competition is bad, cooperation is good

Belief #3: Our goal is a Win-Win situation

Belief #4: Interests are in, positions are out

These beliefs did not arrive out of the blue – they are an outcome of the way Negotiation 1.0 advocacy affected the development of the dispute resolution field in its developmental stages. And they are supported by another, important, widespread belief:

Belief #8: Good relationships are our goal, adversaries our problem

Summarizing the challenges we have raised in this section, we found we could not put it better than Mayer’s own summary:

All of the beliefs...have merit, and the approaches they imply have their place. Many of the beliefs are simple representations of values that are worthwhile holding onto and tactics that are often worthwhile employing. But we have built a great deal of our practice and our field around the notion that these values or beliefs represent reality and that these tactics are the cornerstone of our profession. In doing so, we have often limited the potential role we can play with people in conflict, and we have also raised suspicions about how realistic we are about the real nature of conflict or the actual way people experience conflict....

If these concepts have been comforting and helpful on one level, they have been restrictive and misleading on another. To move our field forward, we have to give up or at least significantly modify some of the ways we have understood our work and approached conflict..." (Mayer 2004: 147).

Return to Relationship: Implications for Teaching

Teacher Self-Awareness

The questions raised above are not just posed as a critique of Negotiation 1.0; they are an acknowledgement of how negotiation educators' worldviews affect their teaching and their teaching goals. We are spotlighting this not to constrain pedagogical freedom of negotiation teachers, but rather to hold up a mirror in which teachers should examine their pedagogy and course content in light of their worldviews. Should worldview and ideology inform negotiation pedagogy? We would suggest that they should not, but will not delve deeper into this in order to not trigger the debate regarding whether this is at all possible. That debate might detract from the *main* discussion that needs to take place, after a generation and more of Negotiation 1.0: identifying worldviews, discussing them, developing them, and investigating their place in the classroom. Viewing negotiation teaching and training as an arena for social change through shifting beliefs was a largely *unspoken* element permeating the Negotiation 1.0 worldview. One of the first things that needs to be done in Negotiation 2.0 is to expose these underlying beliefs to our own scrutiny, and to that of others. This does not mean that the worldview will evaporate, or lose its legitimacy; indeed, the view that shifting beliefs is a training goal has been expressed in Negotiation 2.0 as well (see Alexander and LeBaron 2009). However, it means that worldviews will now become part of the debate – and benefit, evolve and grow as a result.

We expect that as worldviews and teaching approaches become clarified, it will become easier to share coherent views regarding relationship in negotiation with students. The current complexity of the topic is in no small way a result of our effort to present conflicting elements as a congruent picture. Any clarity added to our top-level thinking will pay off in clear messages to our students in the classroom.

New Conversations About Relationships

In order to share those messages, new conversations regarding negotiation relationships need to take place in our classrooms. In these

conversations, contextualizing should be encouraged, and world-view-related approaches (both teachers and students) should be – if not checked at the door – clearly labeled.

How might these new conversations get started? Inviting complexity into the classroom is never a simple thing to do. In addition, raising complexity is sometimes time-consuming, and we are painfully familiar with the all-too-limiting time constraints of negotiation courses and workshops. We will make a few suggestions here, and hope that in the future we or others take on the challenge of designing new lesson plans or teaching materials for this topic.

Assign Relationship-Related Reading Material

In order to counterbalance the covert messages much of the Negotiation 1.0 material conveys about relationship, teachers can assign the class an article/book chapter that takes a different perspective.²² This does not necessarily have to be a piece directly on negotiation; depending on the context of the course/workshop, it might be a piece dealing with marketing, customer relations, or online dating – so long as it raises perspectives that can be contrasted in class with other material students have read.

Address Relationship Head On

As we have seen, relationship is often taught as an important theme under wider topics: as a part of conflict, a part of strategy, etc. Teachers might consider ways in which this concept can be addressed head on – naming it as a primary concept that affects conflict, strategy, communication, etc. – in effect, reversing the way it is taught. In this way, teachers might feel very comfortable with presenting its complexity and the way it affects negotiation dynamics in seemingly incongruent ways. This discussion might be reinforced by an experiential exercise such as a role-play or adventure learning activity targeting relationship as the primary learning objective.

Ask New Questions

Once the necessity of portraying relationship as a complex issue is grasped, raising new questions in the class – and thereby opening the door for students to ask new questions – should be fairly intuitive. Ask students if they ever use relationship in order to get what they need – and how that use works for them. Ask students who have participated in a Prisoner's Dilemma game if they regret not having defected more often. After observing a simulation in which one of the parties got the better of the deal, at the expense of the other, explore in the class what relationship-oriented elements assisted them in achieving this – and discuss whether this might be a

good idea to try in the real world. These are just a few of the paths we usually do not take in class, worried about where they might lead us – but they are well worth walking down.

Conclusion

We have been presenting students with a confusing picture of the notion of relationship in negotiation. At the source of this tendency is the fact that relationship is needed as a supporting column, reinforcing some of the unspoken ideological underpinnings of Negotiation 1.0. We hope that the insights of a generation will allow for new classroom conversations regarding this elusive concept, one that presents it in a more complex light and one that might turn out to be more beneficial to students.

Notes

¹ The cited book's effect on the field of negotiation needs no introduction from us. We chose it as representative of Negotiation 1.0 because its effect on negotiation teaching is at least as great as its effect on the practice of negotiation. Nowhere was this more obvious than at the "Best of Negotiation 1.0" baseline negotiation training showcased at the 2008 Rome Conference, in which the book's influence was tangible – including regarding the topic of relationship.

² In terms of multiple methodologies, parts of the *Getting to Yes* method are often taught through more than one technique. Students might be assigned the book to read, and in addition hear a lecture, view a presentation, have the points exemplified through a video clip, apply them in a simulation and have them re-stressed in debrief.

³ In this exercise, students are asked to count the number of times a letter appears in a sentence – and for various perception-related reasons, come up with quite varied answers, despite their all viewing the same sentence. See an example at <http://www.bouldertherapist.com/html/humor/WordPlays/f's.html> (last accessed May 18, 2010).

⁴ In this exercise, a teacher's instruction to focus on the task of counting repetitions of an occurrence causes students to have "tunnel vision," completely tuning out other things happening on-screen. See examples of this at <http://viscog.beckman.illinois.edu/flashmovie/15.php> and <http://www.break.com/index/awareness-test.html> (last accessed May 18, 2010).

⁵ In this exercise, students are presented with a drawing in which they perceive a young woman. Often, their brain "flickers" to allow them to see another figure drawn in the same picture, from a different angle: this one an old woman. See examples at <http://mathworld.wolfram.com/YoungGirl-OldWomanIllusion.html> (last accessed May 18, 2010).

⁶ For different approaches to the element of relationship in the context of the Turkish bazaar, see Bernard, *Reorienting the Trainer to Navigate – Not Nego-*

tiate – *Islamic Cultural Values*, in this volume and Docherty, *Worldviews and Negotiation Generation 1.5 and 2.0*, in this volume.

⁷ See above, note 3.

⁸ In Ury's follow-up *Getting Past No*, this lesson is repeated, but again with an incomplete exploration of the issues, placing the means on the same footing as the ends and implying a universality to this argument when there are many situations in which a victory in a power struggle might be more effective than using power merely to even the scales in order to attain a collaborative agreement (see, Ury 1991, chapter five).

⁹ For an example of a detailed discussion regarding choice between strategic approaches to negotiation, see chapter two of Pruitt and Kim's (2004) *Social Conflict: Escalation, Stalemate and Settlement*. Such a contextual and analytical discussion of choosing between cooperation and competition is noticeably lacking in *Getting to Yes*.

¹⁰ In one sense, the tourist negotiator is not just a one-shot deal: the effect that the tourist's behavior might have on the perception of one's entire nation (by the merchant, by groups of merchants, etc.) is potentially relevant. Arguably, *Getting to Yes* relies on this extension of relationship: if we model interest-based negotiation, then the behavior may spread and negotiation will become easier as a result. Whether one chooses not to compete (and possibly accept a worse outcome) based on this belief may depend on whether one finds this scenario likely.

¹¹ Of course, distrust in no way means that a relationship is always negative or unimportant; distrust can be contextual and exist simultaneously with a great deal of trust. Take for example a car sales representative whom one might trust completely in a social context but not at all when buying a vehicle. Roy Lewicki (2006) provides a summary of how trust and distrust can exist side-by-side in an existing relationship. Nevertheless, some relationships (based on few interactions or reputation alone) may be actively negative, a dynamic that may well be in play in the bazaar where fear of the other culture could play a role in how a tourist approaches the negotiation.

¹² One divide that seems to stand out is whether a model of negotiation should be chronological or sequential ("We start with this, and then we do that") in its depiction, or whether it should be atemporal, focusing instead on elements always present and at play within a negotiation process. These models tend to vary in their precise content based on teachers' and authors' preferences, worldviews and experience. For example, a sequential model might include six stages beginning with preparation and ending with agreement, or it might divide up the process into ten stages beginning with the awareness of a need and ending with implementation of the agreement. An atemporal approach might focus on four principles (as in the original *Getting to Yes* model), seven elements (as in the popular Harvard Negotiation Workshop model), three crucial variables (as Herb Cohen (1980) highlights), ten elements (as one of the authors prefers to use) or any other way of dissecting the forces at play in the process. While some approaches are more popular than others, it would seem that there is no one negotiation framework that has been largely canonized. Although, if one would combine the book sales of *Getting to Yes* with the ubiquitous training programs modeled on the Harvard training program, one might guess that the atem-

poral model introduced in the former and expanded (from four elements to seven) in the latter is probably the model most commonly encountered.

¹³ Perhaps we should comment that even in courses where the graphic depiction itself is not used, the approaches it contains are laid out as a spectrum of possibilities to choose from, further widening the ubiquity of the model. We have certainly seen this approach in many training settings and university courses. However, as it is challenging to “cite” a course (as the reader cannot check this out for themselves), we might mention that we encounter the five behaviors/strategies/styles without their breakdown into the dual concerns scheme in the negotiation literature as well. See, for example, the discussion about “bargaining styles” opening Richard Shell’s *Bargaining for Advantage: Negotiation Strategies for Reasonable People* (2006).

¹⁴ Pruitt and Kim (2004) limit this to four possible choices. In their opinion, compromise is not a distinct solution but rather “a kind of ‘lazy’ problem solving, involving a half-hearted attempt to find a solution serving both parties’ interests” (Pruitt and Kim 2004: 41). We included compromise here, viewing it, as many others do, as a distinct strategy in its own right; however, we dispute that its proper place on the graph is in the center, equidistant from the other strategies, as we will discuss.

¹⁵ For information on how two parties may differ on whether a given value is fair, see Welsh 2006. As for the idea that in some situations a midpoint in both parties’ zone of agreement may make the most economic sense (explaining the concept of Pareto efficiency therein), see Korobkin 2000.

¹⁶ In this popular simulation, two parties have seemingly incompatible interests: they both need a supply of a rare fruit in order to develop a cure for an impending disaster. However, careful reading of the instructions, and cooperative process-behavior (including sharing interests, divulging information, etc.) might lead them to a cooperative solution, as they each really need different parts of the fruit to achieve their goals; one party needs the peel, and the other the juice.

¹⁷ This oft-told tale, attributed to Mary Parker Follett, incorporates a theme similar to that discussed above. Two sisters fight over an orange, not realizing they need different parts to achieve their separate goals: one needs the fruit to squeeze into juice, while the other needs the peel to make jam.

¹⁸ A third component, noticeably lacking, is a discussion of how to compete effectively, if that strategy is chosen. The reasons for this are detailed in the discussion section below.

¹⁹ Available at http://www.pon.org/catalog/index.php?manufacturers_id=14&osCsId=3e6a69b3b364dff9579f06d1dbc61241 (last accessed May 18, 2010).

²⁰ There are many other variations of the game, which are teaching variations as opposed to structural variations. For example, some teachers conduct a single exercise between four students, in a fishbowl observed by all students. Some teachers tweak the amount of communication students are allowed to have, or throw in relational data relevant to the storyline, to affect the interactions. Different versions of this game, with teaching manuals, can be found at: http://media.wiley.com/assets/manual/sample_download.pdf; http://www.ag.ohio-state.edu/~bdg/pdf_docs/h/TB9A.pdf; and

<http://nationalqualitycenter.org/files/17179/08%20Win%20as%20Much%20as%20You%20Can%20Game.pdf> (last accessed May 18, 2010).

²¹ Mayer's use of the word "our" invokes the wider field of conflict resolution (including negotiation), and this critique is only partially relevant to negotiation itself, the focus of this book. Still, the development of alternative dispute resolution and that of the approach to negotiation encapsulated in Negotiation 1.0 are undeniably intertwined, and we feel that drawing on Mayer's insights is certainly appropriate here.

²² A good example of a different presentation of relationship that is more complex yet still packaged neatly into a model of its own would be Roberge and Lewicki, *Should We Trust*, in this volume.

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